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Abstract
For object reallocation problems, if preferences are strict but otherwise unrestricted,
the Top Trading Cycle rule (TTC) is the leading rule: It is the only rule satisfying effi-
ciency, the endowment lower bound, and strategy-proofness; moreover, TTC coincides
with the core. However, on the subdomain of single-peaked preferences, Bade (2019a)
defines a new rule, the “crawler”, which also satisfies the first three properties. Our first
theorem states that the crawler and a naturally defined “dual” rule are actually the same.
Next, for object allocation problems, we define a probabilistic version of the crawler by
choosing an endowment profile at random according to a uniform distribution, and apply-
ing the original definition. Our second theorem states that this rule is the same as the “ran-
dom priority rule” which, as proved by Knuth (1996) and Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez
(1998), is equivalent to the “core from random endowments”.
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1 Introduction
Consider a group of agents each of whom is endowed with an indivisible good, called an “ob-
ject”. Each agent has preferences over the objects. The initial allocation may not be efficient
(in the sense of Pareto efficiency) and the goal is reallocating the objects so as to achieve
efficiency as well as possibly other socially desirable properties. An example of this type
of problems is when the agents are households and the objects are housing units they own
(what Shapley and Scarf (1974) call a “housing market”). A rule is a single-valued mapping
that associates with each such problem an allocation, interpreted as a recommendation for the
problem. If preferences are strict but otherwise unrestricted, the Top Trading Cycle rule (TTC)
is the leading rule (Shapley and Scarf, 1974): It is the only rule satisfying three desirable prop-
erties, “efficiency”, the “endowment lower bound”,1 and “strategy-proofness” (Ma, 1994).2
Interestingly, TTC is not the only rule satisfying these properties on the subdomain of
“single-peaked” preferences. Returning to our example of a housing market, suppose that
the housing units are of different sizes and that each household evaluates units based on their
size. A single person may prefer a small unit; a family with children may prefer a large one.
Each household has an ideal size; the further the size of a unit is from this ideal size, in either
direction, the less desirable the unit is. Thus, households have single-peaked preferences with
respect to the order. Instead of size, the order could be based on how expensive they are, or
their proximity to a school or to the central business district. Many other examples can be
found where agents have single-peaked preferences with respect to some reference order on
the object set.3
On the single-peaked domain, Bade (2019a) defines a new rule, which she calls the “crawler”,
and shows that this rule, as TTC does, satisfies efficiency, the endowment lower bound, and
strategy-proofness. The idea underlying the crawler is as follows. Objects are labeled in such a
1Another common name for this property is “individual rationality”.
2Other proofs of this uniqueness result can be found in Svensson (1999), Anno (2015), Sethuraman (2016),
and Bade (2019a).
3Accordingly, this domain has been studied from several other viewpoints (Liu, 2018; Damamme et al., 2015;
Beynier et al., 2019). Moreover, for other types of resources allocation problems, a single-peakedness is a natural
assumption. An example is when an infinitely divisible commodity has to be fully allocated among a group of
agents (Sprumont, 1991).
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way that preferences are single-peaked with respect to this order. Similarly, agents are ordered
according to their ownership of the objects. They are visited from left to right and each agent
in turn is asked if he most prefers his endowment or an object to the left of his endowment.
If yes, he is asked which object he most prefers and he is assigned that object and leaves.
Otherwise, the agent on his immediate right is asked the same question. At least one agent
has to most prefer his endowment or an object to the left of his endowment. So some agent is
eventually assigned an object, and he leaves with his assignment. Then the problem is updated
as follows. Consider all of the agents whose endowments are between the object assigned to
the agent who left and the object that agent owned. For each of those agents, ownership is
shifted by one spot to the right. This sweeping process is repeated with the updated problem,
and continue in this way until every agent has been assigned an object.
Obviously, one could define a “dual” rule by visiting agents from right to left (Bade, 2019a).
One would expect the crawler and its dual to differ. Because each of the two crawlers visits
agents in a specific order, one may be concerned that the specific order that is chosen confers
a particular advantage to some agents based on the location of their endowments relative to
the location of other agents’ endowments. Our first result is that they are in fact the same
(Theorem 1). Thus, the order in which agents are visited confers no such advantage.
The “core” is one of the most important solutions concepts in economics. For object real-
location problems, an allocation is in the core if there are no coalition and assignments for the
members of the coalition such that (i) the objects assigned to them are the objects they collec-
tively own, and (ii) each member of the coalition is at least as well off and at least one of them
is better off. TTC bears a strong relation to the core: For each preference profile, including
each profile of single-peaked preferences, the core is a singleton and the allocation selected by
TTC coincides with the allocation in the core (Shapley and Scarf, 1974; Roth and Postlewaite,
1977).
Although the core concept pertains to reallocation problems, it also relates to a family of
rules for “object allocation problems”; there, instead of being owned individually, objects are
owned collectively. Well-studied rules for object allocation problems are the “sequential pri-
ority rules”4: To each order on the agent set is associated such a rule: The agent who is first
4Another common name for these rules is “serial dictatorships”.
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is assigned his most preferred object; the agent who is second is assigned his most preferred
object among the remaining ones; and so on. Obviously, none of these rules achieve any punc-
tual fairness notion. However, this lack of fairness can be alleviated by allowing rules to select
probability distribution over allocations. These are “probabilistic rules”. Applying the idea to
the sequential priority rules, we would choose an order on the agent set at random according
to a uniform distribution and apply the induced sequential priority rule. The resulting rule is
known as the “random priority rule” (Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez, 1998).5 Another way of
attempting to achieve some fairness is by choosing an endowment profile at random according
to a uniform distribution and selecting the core of the induced object reallocation problem.
The resulting probabilistic rule is known as the “core from random endowments”. It turns out
that the random priority rule is the same as the core from random endowments (Knuth, 1996;
Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez, 1998).
We may ask whether the crawler bears a similar relationship to the sequential priority rules.
The procedures underlying the definitions of the crawler and of the sequential priority rules are
based on completely different considerations. Hence, one may be doubtful that such a relation
exists. Yet, our second theorem provides a positive answer to this question. Given a preference
profile, let us select an endowment profile at random according to a uniform distribution, and
apply the crawler to the induced object reallocation problem. We call the probabilistic rule
so defined the “crawler from random endowments”. Our second result is that the crawler
from random endowments is the same probabilistic rule as the random priority rule (Theorem
2). Therefore, it is also the same as the core from random endowments. If there are at least
three agents, the crawler differs from TTC (Bade, 2019a). Hence, the crawler does not in
general select an allocation from the core. However, our equivalence result can be interpreted
as mitigating this fact, and it should further strengthen the appeal of this rule.
Several other equivalence results in the same vein have been obtained (Pathak and Sethuraman,
2011; Lee and Sethuraman, 2011; So¨nmez and U¨nver, 2005; Ekici, 2017; Carroll, 2014; Bade,
2019b). Each of them states that a probabilistic version of a generalized TTC is equivalent to
the random priority rule (or a variant). However, as we show in Section 3.1, our result cannot
be deduced from any of these equivalences.
5Another common name for this rule is the “random serial dictatorship”.
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This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define the model. We formally define
the crawler. Also, we define a dual rule by visiting agents from right to left as opposed to
from left to right, and state our first equivalence result; the crawler and this dual rule are the
same. In Section 3, we define the crawler from random endowments, and state our second
equivalence result: the crawler from random endowments is the same as the random priority
rule, and hence the same as the core from random endowments. Proofs are collected in the
appendix.
2 Model
There is a set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of agents and a set O of objects (|O| = n).6 Each agent
is endowed with one object in O, no two agents being endowed with the same object. We
denote by ω the endowment profile, i.e., ω = (ω1, ω2, . . . , ωn).
7,8 Each agent i ∈ N has a
strict preference relation Pi over O. Let P be the set of all preferences. We write Ri to denote
the “at least as desirable” relation associated with Pi. That is, for each pair o, o
′ ∈ O, o Ri o
′
if only if either o Pi o
′ or o = o′. We represent Pi by an ordered list of the objects, such as
Pi : o, o˜, o
′, . . . .
Let PN be the set of preference profiles for N . Our generic notation for a preference profile is
P = (Pi)i∈N .
9
A problem is defined by a preference profile and an endowment profile. An allocation is
a list x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) such that for each i ∈ N , xi ∈ O, and for each pair i, j ∈ N
such that i 6= j, xi 6= xj . Let X be the set of allocations.
10 A rule is a single-valued mapping
ϕ : PN × X → X that associates with each (P, ω) ∈ PN × X an allocation x ∈ X .
Let L be the set of strict orders on O. We consider the following restriction on preference
profiles. There is an order≺∈ L onO such that each agent has a unique most preferred object;
the further with respect to≺ an object is from his most preferred object, in either direction, the
6GivenN ′ ⊂ N , we denote−N ′ the subsetN\N ′ of agents.
7The ith coordinate of ω is the object endowed by agent i.
8GivenN ′ ⊂ N , we denote by ωN ′ the endowment profile of N ′.
9GivenN ′ ⊂ N , we denote by PN ′ the preference profile of N ′.
10GivenN ′ ⊂ N , we denote by XN ′ the set of assignments forN ′.
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worse off he is. Formally, a preference profile P is single-peaked if there is an order ≺∈ L
over the object set
o1 ≺ o2 ≺ · · · ≺ on
such that for each i ∈ N , one of the following three conditions holds:
• there is t ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n− 1} such that
Pi : ot, ot−1, ot−2, . . . , o1 and Pi : ot, ot+1, ot+2, . . . , on
• Pi : on, on−1, on−2, . . . , o1,
• Pi : o1, o2, o3, . . . , on.
We denote by p(Pi) agent i’s most preferred object at Pi.
Throughout, we consider preference profiles that are single-peaked with respect to some
reference order on the object set.
Given≺∈ L, for each o ∈ O, we denote by o− 1 and o+ 1 the objects that are adjacent to
object o. (Obviously, the leftmost object has no object to its left, and the rightmost object has
no object to its right.) Likewise, given ≺∈ L, for each i ∈ N , we denote by i − 1 and i + 1
the agents whose endowments are adjacent to that of agent i. (The agent whose endowment
is leftmost has no one to his left, and the agent whose endowment is rightmost has no one to
his right.) Moreover, for each pair i, j ∈ N , if agent j is to the right of agent i, we write that
i ≺ j.
Let f : {1, 2, · · · , n} → N be a bijection and let f = (f(1), f(2), · · · , f(n)) be the
resulting strict order on N . Let F be the set of all orders on N . For each Pi ∈ P and each
O′ ⊆ O, let Xi(O
′) be the most preferred object of agent i ∈ N in O′ at Pi, i.e.,
Xi(O
′) = o ⇐⇒ o ∈ O′ and for each o′ ∈ O′\{o}, o Pi o
′.
We conclude this section by defining three basic properties. Recall that ϕ is our generic
notation for a rule. First, we require that for each problem, the chosen allocation be such
that there is no other allocation that all agents find at least as desirable and at least one agent
prefers:
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Efficiency: For each (P, ω) ∈ PN × X , there is no x ∈ X such that for each i ∈ N ,
xi Ri ϕi(P, ω), and there is j ∈ N such that xj Pj ϕj(P, ω).
Second, we require that for each problem, each agent find his assignment at least as desir-
able as his endowment:
Endowment lower bound: For each (P, ω) ∈ PN × X and each i ∈ N ,
ϕi(P, ω) Ri ωi.
Third, we require that no agent ever benefit by misrepresenting his preferences:
Strategy-proofness: For each (P, ω) ∈ PN ×X , each i ∈ N , and each P ′i ∈ P ,
ϕi((Pi, P−i), ω) Ri ϕi((P
′
i , P−i), ω).
2.1 The crawler
In the context of object reallocation problems with strict preferences, TTC has been the most
central rule in the literature: It is well known that TTC is the only rule satisfying efficiency, the
endowment lower bound, and strategy-proofness (Ma, 1994). However, on the single-peaked
domain, TTC is not the only rule satisfying these properties. Bade (2019a) defines a new rule
for this domain, and shows that this rule also satisfies these three properties.
The idea underlying the rule is as follows. Objects are labeled in such a way that preferences
are single-peaked with respect to the order. Agents are visited according to the way the objects
they own are ordered, from left to right, we say “in ascending order”. Each agent in turn is
asked if he most prefers his endowment or an object to the left of his endowment. If yes,
he is further asked which specific object it is. Depending on his answer, we take one of the
following actions:
(1) If an agent’s most preferred object is to the right of his endowment, we move to the next
agent.
(2) If an agent’s most preferred object is his endowment, he is assigned his endowment. He is
removed with his assignment.
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(3) If an agent’s most preferred object is to the left of his endowment, he is assigned his most
preferred object. He is removed with his assignment.
When an agent is removed, the problem is updated as follows. Consider all of the agents
whose endowments are between the object assigned to the agent who left and the object that
agent owned. Each of their ownership is shifted by one spot to the right. Hence, each of these
agents owns a new object. This sweeping procedure is repeated with the updated problem.
In anticipation of a forthcoming definition, we refer to the rule just defined as the ascending
crawler. We denote it by ACR.
The formal description is as follows.
Ascending crawler: Let ≺∈ L, P ∈ PN , where P is single-peaked with respect to ≺, and
ω ∈ X .
Label the objects in O in such a way that for each t ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1 }, ot ≺ ot+1. Label
the agents in N in such a way that for each t ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, we have ωit ≺ ωit+1. Let
Ô0 = {o1, . . . , on} and N̂
0 = {i1, . . . , in}.
At each step k ≥ 1, let
k∗ ≡ min
{1,··· ,n−k}
{
t : ot Pit ot+1, where ot, ot+1 ∈ Ô
k−1
}
.
Let ACRik∗ (P, ω) = Xik∗ (O
k−1). Let Ok ≡ Ok−1\{Xik∗(O
k−1)} and Nk ≡ Nk−1\{ik∗}.
Label the objects in Ok in such a way that for each t ∈ {1, . . . , n − k − 1}, ot ≺ ot+1.
Label the agents in Nk in such a way that for each t ∈ {1, . . . , n− k − 1}, at step k − 1, we
have it ≺ it+1. Let Ô
k = {o1, . . . , on−k} and N̂
k = {i1, . . . , in−k}.
Example 1. [Illustrating the ascending crawler.] LetN = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Let ω1 ≺ ω2 ≺ ω3 ≺ ω4.
Let P ∈ PN be defined by
P1 : ω4, ω3, ω2, ω1
P2 : ω2, ω1, ω3, ω4
P3 : ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4
P4 : ω2, ω1, ω3, ω4.
At each step, we ask the following question to the agent we visit;
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‘Among the available objects, do you most prefer your endowment or an object to the left of
your endowment? If the answer is yes, which object do you most prefer?’11
Step 1: Agent 1 is queried first. Because his answer is no, agent 2 is queried next.
Agent 2 answers yes, and he most prefers his endowment. Hence, he is assigned his
endowment. He leaves with his assignment.
Step 2: Agent 1 is queried first. Because his answer is no, agent 3 is queried next.
Agent 3 answers yes, and he most prefers ω1. Hence, he is assigned that object and
leaves with his assignment. The endowment of agent 1 is shifted by one spot to the
right.
Step 3: We repeat the sequence of queries. Agent 4 is the fist agent who answers yes,
and he most prefers object ω3. Hence, he is assigned that object and leaves with his
assignment. The endowment of agent 1 is shifted by one spot to the right.
Step 4: Agent 1 is the only agent who has not been assigned an object yet and object
ω4 is the only available object. Hence, agent 1 is assigned object ω4 and leaves with his
assignment.
Because no agent remains, the algorithm terminates, yielding
ACR(P, ω) = (ω4, ω2, ω1, ω3).
Figure 1 illustrates the process. At each step, the agent who is assigned an object at that step
is circled. At each step, agents who have already been assigned objects are shown in boxes.
11For the agent whose endowment is leftmost, we ask ‘among the available objects, do you most prefer your
endowment?’
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P3
P2 P4 P1
object 1 2 3 4
agent 1 2 3 4
step 1 1 2 3 4
step 2 1 2 3 4
step 3 2 1 43
step 4 2 13 4
Figure 1: The ascending crawler.
2.2 The first equivalence result: The equivalence between the ascending
crawler and the descending crawler
Of course, as pointed out by Bade (2019a), one can define a “dual” rule by visiting agents
from right to left, let us say “in descending order”. Let us call this dual rule the descending
crawler. We denote it by DCR. We omit the formal definition and only show how to apply
to our Example 1.
Example 1 (Continued). [Illustrating the descending crawler.] At each step, we ask the fol-
lowing question to the agent we visit;
‘Among the available objects, do you most prefer your endowment or an object to the right of
your endowment? If the answer is yes, which object do you most prefer?’12
Step 1: Agent 4 is queried first. Because his answer is no, agent 3 is queried next.
Because his answer is no, agent 2 is queried next. Agent 2 answers yes, and he most
12For the agent whose endowment is rightmost, we ask ‘among the available objects, do you most prefer your
endowment?’
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prefers his endowment. Hence, he is assigned that object and leaves with his assignment.
Step 2: Agent 4 is queried first. Because his answer is no, agent 3 is queried next.
Because his answer is no, agent 1 is queried next. Agent 1 answers yes, and he most
prefers object ω4. Hence, he is assigned that object and leaves with his assignment. The
endowments of agents 3 and 4 are shifted by one spot to the left.
Step 3: We repeat the sequence of queries. Agent 3 is the first agent who answers yes,
and he most prefers object ω1. Hence, he is assigned that object and leaves with his
assignment.
Step 4: Agent 4 is the only agent who has not been assigned an object yet and object
ω3 is the only available object. Hence, agent 4 is assigned object ω3 and leaves with his
assignment.
Because no agent remains, the algorithm terminates, yielding
DCR(P, ω) = (ω4, ω2, ω1, ω3).
P3
P2 P4 P1
object 1 2 3 4
agent 1 2 3 4
step 1 1 2 3 4
step 2 1 2 3 4
step 3 2 4 13
step 4 2 13 4
Figure 2: The descending crawler.
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In the example, the assignments obtained by applying the two rules are the same. In general,
one could expect the two rules to select different allocations. However, it turns out that they
are always the same:
Theorem 1. The ascending crawler is the same rule as the descending crawler. That is,
ACR = DCR.
Because the ascending crawler visits agents from left to right, one may be concerned that
this specific order confers a particular advantage to some agents based on the location of their
endowments relative to the location of other agents’ endowments. For example, because agents
whose endowments are on the left side of the order are visited first, one may suspect that these
agents enjoy some advantage at the expense of the agents whose endowments are on the right
side of the order. However, Theorem 1 implies that the order in which agents are visited gives
no benefit to any particular agent.
Hereafter, for simplicity, we refer to these rules as the crawler, using the notation CR.
Without loss of generality, for each endowment profile, when we operate the crawler, we apply
the ascending procedure.
3 The second equivalence result: The equivalence between
the crawler from random endowments and the random
priority rule
One of the most important solution concepts in economics is the “core”. An allocation is
blocked by a coalition if the members of the coalition can exchange their endowments among
themselves in such a way that each of them finds his assignment at least as desirable as his
component of the allocation, and at least one agent in the coalition prefers his assignment to his
component of the allocation. An allocation is in the core if there is no such coalition.13 For each
preference profile, including each profile of single-peaked preferences, the core is a singleton
13Formally, allocation x ∈ X is blocked by coalitionN ′ ⊆ N at (P, ω) ∈ PN ×X if there is (yi)i∈N ′ ∈ XN ′
such that
⋃
N ′ yi =
⋃
N ′ ωi, for each i ∈ N
′, yi Ri xi, and there is j ∈ N ′ such that yj Pj xj . An allocation is
in the core of (P, ω) if there is no such a coalition.
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and the allocation selected by TTC coincides with the allocation in the core (Shapley and Scarf,
1974; Roth and Postlewaite, 1977).
Instead of each agent being endowed with one object, agents may collectively own a set of
objects and a rule then has to assign each agent one object. We refer to this type of problems as
“object allocation problems”. Although the core concept is defined for reallocation problems,
it can help provide solutions to object allocation problems. To explain how, we first need to
define the concept of a “sequential priority rule”: (formal definition is given below) To each
order on the agent set is associated such a rule. The agent who is first is assigned his most
preferred object, the agent who is second is assigned his most preferred object among the
remaining ones, and so on. None of these rules treats agents fairly. However, their unfairness
can be mitigated by considering lotteries. Formally, a lottery is a probability distribution
over allocations, p = (p1, · · · , pn!), such that for each k, pk ≥ 0, and
∑
k pk = 1. We
denote the degenerate lottery that assigns probability 1 to allocation x by px. Let ∆(X ) be
the set of all lotteries. A probabilistic rule is a single-valued mapping which associates a
lottery with each preference profile. A probabilistic version of the sequential priority rules is
obtained by choosing an order on the agent set at random according to a uniform distribution
and applying the induced sequential priority rule. This rule is called the “random priority rule”
(Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez, 1998).
The random priority rule is a leading rule in the context of probabilistic assignments.
Interestingly, the probability distribution over the allocations derived by applying the ran-
dom priority rule is the same as that derived by applying the core from random endow-
ments: For each problem, choose an endowment profile at random according to a uniform
distribution, and select the core of the induced object reallocation problem (Knuth, 1996;
Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez, 1998).
Motivated by this equivalence, we study the relationship between the random priority rule
and the crawler from random endowments: For each problem, choose an endowment profile
at random according to a uniform distribution, and apply the crawler to the induced object
reallocation problem.
First, let us note that if there are at least three agents, the crawler and TTC disagree (Bade,
2019a). Hence, the crawler does not always select an allocation in the core. Also, the pro-
cedures underlying the crawler and the sequential priority rules differ. Thus, one should be
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doubtful that there is any relationship between the random priority rule and the crawler from
random endowments. However, as we show, the probability distributions over allocations ob-
tained by applying these two rules are the same.
Let us now formally define the rules under discussion. Here, a problem is simply defined
as a pair of a preference profile and an object set. However, TTC and the crawler select an
allocation on the basis of both a preference profile and an endowment profile, so that the
family of rules that we are defining are parametrized by an endowment profile. Reflecting this
parametrization, we denote each of these rules by TTCω and CRω, respectively.
Given f ∈ F , the sequential priority rule induced by f , SP f : PN → X , is defined by
setting, for each P ∈ PN ,
SP f
f(1)(P ) = Xf(1)(O),
SP f
f(2)(P ) = Xf(2)
(
O \
{
SP f
f(1)(P )
})
,
...
SP f
f(i)(P ) = Xf(i)
(
O \
i−1⋃
j=1
{
SP f
f(j)(P )
})
,
...
SP f
f(n)(P ) = Xf(n)
(
O \
n−1⋃
j=1
{
SP f
f(j)(P )
})
.
The random priority rule, RP : PN → ∆(X ), is defined by setting, for each P ∈ PN ,
RP (P ) =
∑
f∈F
1
n!
pSP
f (P ).
The core from random endowments RTTC : PN → ∆(X ), is defined by setting, for
each P ∈ PN ,
RTTC(P ) =
∑
ω∈X
1
n!
pTTC
ω(P ).
Theorem (Knuth, 1996; Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez, 1998). The core from random endow-
ments is the same probabilistic rule as the random priority rule. That is, RTTC = RP .
The crawler from random endowments RCR : PN → ∆(X ), is defined by setting, for
each P ∈ PN ,
RCR(P ) =
∑
ω∈X
1
n!
pCR
ω(P ).
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Here is our second theorem.
Theorem 2. The crawler from random endowments is the same probabilistic rule as the ran-
dom priority rule. That is, RCR = RP .
The proof involves constructing a mapping g : X → F , and showing that (i) the crawler
induced by each endowment profile and the sequential priority rule induced by the order on the
agent set given by the mapping select the same allocation, and (ii) the mapping is one-to-one
and onto. Knuth (1996), Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez (1998), and we all identify a mapping
that associates an order over the agent set with each feasible allocation, and show that this
mapping is one-to-one and onto. However, how we construct our mapping differs from theirs.
Their mapping is based on the cycles that come out of the application of TTC. By contrast,
ours is defined by recursively finding pairs of agents one of them “envies” the other, and
giving higher priority to the second agent than to the first agent. Combining Theorem 2 and
the equivalence result in Knuth (1996) and Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez (1998), we deduce
another equivalence result:
Corollary 1. The crawler from random endowments is the same probabilistic rule as the core
from random endowments. That is, RCR = RTTC.
Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 contribute to our understanding of how the crawler relates to
the core. Although the crawler does not always select an allocation in the core, the allocations
selected by the crawler and the allocations selected by the core are the same in a probabilistic
sense.
3.1 Discussion
Following the equivalence result between the core from random endowments and the ran-
dom priority rule (Knuth, 1996; Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez, 1998), several other equiva-
lence results have been proved (Pathak and Sethuraman, 2011; Lee and Sethuraman, 2011;
So¨nmez and U¨nver, 2005; Ekici, 2017; Carroll, 2014; Bade, 2019b). Each of these papers
generalizes TTC, and shows that the probabilistic rule associated with the generalized TTC is
the same as the random priority rule (or a variant of it). None of these rules are equivalent to
the crawler. Hence, our Theorem 2 cannot be deduced from any of these results.
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In particular, a large family of rules, which are efficient, strategy-proof, and non-bossy,14
is defined by Pycia and U¨nver (2017). They show that on the domain of strict preferences,
any rule satisfying the above properties is a member of the family. Rules in their family,
so-called the “trading cycles” rules, are parametrized by a “control-rights structure” (formal
definition is given in the appendix). The procedure underlying their definition is similar to
TTC, but control-rights structures add flexibility to TTC. Now, given a control-rights structure,
the associated probabilistic rule is obtained by permuting the agent set at random according to
a uniform distribution, and applying the induced rule.
For each rule in the trading cycles family, the probabilistic rule associated with it is the
same rule as the random priority rule (Bade, 2019b). This result holds for each preference
profile, and in particular of course, it holds on the subdomain of problems with profiles of
single-peaked preferences. Thus, on this domain her equivalence result remains true; yet, on
this subdomain, there may be rules that are not the trading cycles rules, but are still efficient,
strategy-proof, and non-bossy. In fact, the crawler is an example (Appendix C). Therefore, our
Theorem 2 cannot be deduced from Bade (2019b)’s previous result.
4 Conclusion
We have shown two equivalence results pertaining a new rule defined by Bade (2019a) for
object reallocation problems when preferences are single-peaked. The first equivalence result
states that this rule, which she calls the crawler, and which we call the ascending crawler, is
the same as the dual rule that she proposes, and which we call the descending crawler. This
result shows that the order in which agents are visited does not confer a particular advantage
to agents based on the location of their endowments relative to the location of other agents’
endowments.
The second equivalence result states that for object allocation problems, the probability
distribution over allocations selected by the crawler from random endowments is the same
as the probability distribution selected by the random priority rule. Hence, it is the same as
the probability distribution over allocations derived from the core from random endowments.
14Formally, ϕ is non-bossy if for each (P, ω) ∈ PN × X , each i ∈ N , and each P ′i ∈ P , if
ϕi ((P
′
i , P−i) , ω) = ϕi ((Pi, P−i) , ω), then ϕ ((P
′
i , P−i) , ω) = ϕ ((Pi, P−i) , ω).
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Although the crawler does not always select an allocation from the core, our second result
mitigates this fact, and should strengthen the appeal of this rule.
Appendices
Given ≺∈ L, let |o − o′| be the number of objects between objects o and o′, including these
objects. So for example, the distance between objects o and o+ 1 is 2.
A Proof of Theorem 1
Let (P, ω) ∈ PN × X . Because both the ascending and the descending crawlers meet the
endowment lower bound, for each i ∈ N such that ωi ≺ ACRi(P, ω), we have ωi ≺ p(Pi).
This implies that ωi - DCRi(P, ω).
Claim 1. For each i ∈ N such that ωi ≺ ACRi(P, ω), we have ACRi(P, ω) = DCRi(P, ω).
Proof of Claim 1. Let i1 ∈ N be such that ωi1 ≺ ACRi1(P, ω). Suppose, by way of contradic-
tion, thatDCRi1(P, ω) 6= ACRi1(P, ω). This implies that there isN
′ = {i1, i2, . . . , ik−1, ik} ⊆ N ,
where ik−1 ≡ i and ik ≡ j, such that
• for each l ∈ {2, . . . , k},DCRil(P, ω) = ACRil−1(P, ω); and
• either
(1) for each l ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, ACRil(P, ω) Pil DCRil(P, ω); or
(2) for each l ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1},DCRil(P, ω) Pil ACRil(P, ω).
Suppose that Case (1) holds. Because both crawlers are efficient,DCRj(P, ω)Pj ACRj(P, ω).
By the definition of the crawlers, either (1-i) ωi ≺ ACRi(P, ω) ≺ ωj or (1-ii) ωj ≺ ACRi(P, ω) ≺ ωi.
Suppose that Case (2) holds. Because both crawlers are efficient,ACRj(P, ω)Pj DCRj(P, ω).
By the definition of the crawlers, either (2-i) ωi ≺ ACRi(P, ω) ≺ ωj or (2-ii) ωj ≺ ACRi(P, ω) ≺ ωi.
Arguments for Cases (1-i), (1-ii), (2-i), and (2-ii) are analogous. So without loss of generality,
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we only handle Case (1-i). Let
J ≡ {j ∈ N : ωi ≺ ωj and ωj ≺ ACRj(P, ω)} .
The proof is by contradiction. We show that DCRi(P, ω) = ACRi(P, ω) by applying induc-
tion on |J |. First, let
N ′ ≡ {k ∈ N : ωi ≺ ωk ≺ ωj} ,
S ≡ {k ∈ N : ωi ≺ ωk ≺ ωj and ACRk(P, ω) - ωi} ,
T ≡ {k ∈ N : ωi ≺ ωk ≺ ωj , ACRk(P, ω) - ωk, and ωi ≺ ACRk(P, ω) ≺ ACRi(P, ω)} ,
S ′ ≡ {k ∈ N : ωi ≺ ωk ≺ ωj and ωj - DCRk(P, ω)} , and
T ′ ≡ {k ∈ N : ωi ≺ ωk ≺ ωj, ωk - DCRk(P, ω), and ACRi(P, ω) ≺ DCRk(P, ω) ≺ ωj} .
Note that for each pair X, Y ∈ {S, T, S ′, T ′}, X ∩ Y = ∅ and S ∪ T ∪ S ′ ∪ T ′ ⊆ N ′.
Base Step: Suppose that |J | = 0. The fact that agent j is assigned object ACRi(P, ω) by
the descending crawler implies that S ′ 6= ∅. However, because |J | = 0, for each k ∈ N ′,
we have ACRk(P, ω) - ωk. This implies that p(Pk) - ωk. The fact that S
′ 6= ∅ im-
plies that there is j′ ∈ N such that p(Pj′) - ωj′ ≺ DCRj′(P, ω). This means that the
descending crawler does not meet the endowment lower bound, a contradiction. Therefore,
ACRi(P, ω) = DCRi(P, ω).
Induction hypothesis: Let k ∈ {1, · · · , n−1}. For each |J | ≤ k−1, we haveACRi(P, ω) = DCRi(P, ω).
Induction step: Let |J | = k. By the induction hypothesis, for each j′ ∈ N ′ such that
ωj′ ≺ ACRk(P, ω), we have ACRj′(P, ω) = DCRj′(P, ω). Hence, ACRi(P, ω) - ωj .
The fact that agent i is assigned object ACRi(P, ω) by the ascending crawler implies that
S 6= ∅ and |S ∪ T | ≥ |ACRi(P, ω)− ωi| − 1.
On the other hand, the fact that agent j is assigned object ACRi(P, ω) by the descending
crawler implies that
S ′ 6= ∅ and |ωj − ACRi(P, ω)| − 1 ≤ |S
′ ∪ T ′|.
However,15
|ACRi(P, ω)− ωi|+ |ωj − ACRi(P, ω)| − 3 = |N
′|.
15|ACRi(P, ω)−ωi|+ |ωj−ACRi(P, ω)| includes objects ωi and ωj , and counts objectACRi(P, ω) twice.
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This implies that
|N ′| < |ACRi(P, ω)− ωi|+ |ωj − ACRi(P, ω)| − 2 ≤ |S ∪ T ∪ S
′ ∪ T ′|.
This contradicts the fact that S ∪ T ∪ S ′ ∪ T ′ ⊆ N ′. Therefore, ACRi(P, ω) = DCRi(P, ω).
Consequently,DCRi1(P, ω) = ACRi1(P, ω).
Claim 2. For each i ∈ N such that DCRi(P, ω) ≺ ωi, we have DCRi(P, ω) = ACRi(P, ω).
The proof of Claim 2 is analogous to that of Claim 1. Hence, we omit it.
Claim 3. For each i ∈ N ,
ACRi(P, ω) = ωi ⇐⇒ DCRi(P, ω) = ωi.
Proof of Claim 3. Suppose, by way of contradiction that, there is i ∈ N such that
ACRi(P, ω) = ωi 6= DCRi(P, ω).
Suppose that ωi ≺ DCRi(P, ω). Because the descending crawler meets the endowment lower
bound, the fact that ωi ≺ DCRi(P, ω) implies that ωi ≺ p(Pi). Let i
∗ ∈ N be such that
p(Pi) ≺ ωi∗ , ωi∗ Pi ωi, and for each j ∈ N such that ωi∗ ≺ ωj , we have ωi Pi ωj . Let
J ≡ {o ∈ O : ωi ≺ o - ωi∗}.
Let k∗ ∈ N be such that ωi ≺ ωk∗ , ωi ≺ ACRk∗(P, ω) - ωi∗ , and there is no k ∈ N
such that ωk∗ ≺ ωk and ωi ≺ ACRk(P, ω) - ωi∗ . The fact that ACRi(P, ω) = ωi implies
that each o ∈ J is assigned to some agent whose endowment is to the right of ωi before
agent i is assigned object ωi. Moreover, for each j ∈ N such that ωi ≺ ωj - ωk∗, we
have ωi+1 Pj ωi. This implies that when applying the descending crawler, each o ∈ J is
assigned to some agent before agent i is visited. This implies thatDCRi(P, ω) /∈ J . However,
DCRi(P, ω) 6= ωi. This means that ωi Pi DCRi(P, ω). Hence, the descending crawler does
not meet the endowment lower bound, a contradiction. Therefore, DCRi(P, ω) = ωi. On the
other hand,DCRi(P, ω) ≺ ωi contradicts Claim 2.
Now suppose that there is i ∈ N such that
ACRi(P, ω) 6= ωi = DCRi(P, ω).
The argument for this case is analogous to above. Hence, we omit the proof.
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Proof of Theorem 1. By Claim 3, for each i ∈ N ,
ACRi(P, ω) = ωi ⇐⇒ DCRi(P, ω) = ωi.
This implies that for each i ∈ N ,
ACRi(P, ω) 6= ωi ⇐⇒ DCRi(P, ω) 6= ωi.
Because both crawlers meets the endowment lower bound, for each i ∈ N ,
ωi ≺ ACRi(P, ω) ⇐⇒ ωi ≺ DCRi(P, ω)
while for each i ∈ N ,
ACRi(P, ω) ≺ ωi ⇐⇒ DCRi(P, ω) ≺ ωi.
Claim 1 shows that in the former case, ACRi(P, ω) = DCRi(P, ω). On the other hand, Claim
2 shows that in the later case,ACRi(P, ω) = DCRi(P, ω). Overall,ACR(P, ω) = DCR(P, ω).
B Proof of Theorem 2
Let P ∈ PN . The following lemma shows that for each allocation selected by the sequential
priority rule induced by a given order on the agent set, there is an endowment profile for
which the crawler selects the same allocation at the endowment profile. Conversely, for each
allocation selected by the crawler at a given endowment profile, there is an order on the agent
set such that the sequential priority rule induced by the order selects the same allocation.
Lemma 1.{
x ∈ X : there is f ∈ F such that SP f(P ) = x
}
= {x ∈ X : there is ω ∈ X such that CRω(P ) = x} .
Given a preference profile, the set of allocations selected by TTC at the various endowment
profiles is the same as the set of allocations selected by the sequential priority rule induced by
the various orders on the agent set (Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez, 1998). We show that the set
of allocations selected by the crawler at the various endowment profiles is the same as the set
of allocations selected by TTC at the various endowment profiles. Combining these results,
we derive Lemma 1.
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Lemma (Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez, 1998).
{
x ∈ X : there is f ∈ F such that SP f(P ) = x
}
= {x ∈ X : there is ω ∈ X such that TTCω(P ) = x} .
(1)
Proof of Lemma 1. We show that for each ω ∈ X , there is ω′ ∈ X such that
TTCω(P ) = CRω
′
(P ).
This implies that
{x ∈ X : there is ω ∈ X such that TTCω(P ) = x} ⊆ {x ∈ X : there is ω ∈ X such that CRω(P ) = x} .
The proof for the other direction is analogous. Hence, we only show one direction.
Let ω ∈ X . Because the crawler meets the endowment lower bound, for each i ∈ N ,
CR
TTCω(P )
i (P ) Ri TTC
ω
i (P ).
Because TTC is efficient, there is no i ∈ N such that
CR
TTCω(P )
i (P ) Pi TTC
ω
i (P ).
This implies that
CRTTC
ω(P )(P ) = TTCω(P ).
Together with (1), we have
{
x ∈ X : there is f ∈ F such that SP f(P ) = x
}
= {x ∈ X : there is ω ∈ X such that CRω(P ) = x} .
We now construct a mapping from X into F and show that (i) the crawler induced by an
endowment profile and the sequential priority rule induced by the order on the agent set given
by the mapping select the same allocation, and (ii) the mapping is one-to-one and onto.
Let ω ∈ X . Given g ∈ F , we denote by gi the rank of agent i. The order g(ω) ∈ F is
obtained by the recursive procedure. In the procedure, at each round, we identify two types of
chains formed by agents, an “envy chain” and a “generalized chain”. An envy chain is derived
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by connecting “envy” relations between agents. On the other hand, a generalized chain is
derived by combining envy chains using the order over the agent set that is determined at the
previous round.
Let g0(ω) ∈ F be defined by setting, for each pair i, j ∈ N , g0i (ω) < g
0
j (ω) if and only if
ωi ≺ ωj . For each i ∈ N , let O
0
i = O and H
0
i = ∅.
At each round r ≥ 1,
Step 1: For each i ∈ N such that Or−1i 6= ∅, identify j ∈ N such that CR
ω
j (P ) = Xi(O
r−1
i ).
If j 6= i, we say “agent i envies agent j”, which we write as i→ j. Also, letHri = {Xi(O
r−1
i )}.
If j = i, letHri = O
r−1
i . If there isN
′ = {i1, i2, . . . , ik} such that for each k
′ ∈ {1, . . . , k−1}
agent ik′ envies agent ik′+1, we concatenate these relations, and refer to this resulting chain as
an envy chain formed at round r. If there areN ′, N
′′
⊆ N such that the agents inN ′ form an
envy chain at round r, the agents inN
′′
form an envy chain at round r′ ≤ r, and N ′ ∩N
′′
6= ∅,
we connect these chains as follows.
Case 1: Suppose that {i1, . . . , ik, l} ⊂ N form the following envy chain at round r;
i1 → . . .→ ik → l.
Similarly, suppose that {j1, . . . , jk′, l} ⊂ N form the following envy chain at round
r′ ≤ r;
j1 → . . .→ jk′ → l.
Then we connect these two chains
i1 → . . .→ ik → l
j1
→
. . .
→
jk′
→
Case 2: Suppose that {l, i1, . . . , ik} ⊂ N form the following envy chain at round round r;
l → i1 → . . .→ ik.
Similarly, suppose that {l, j1, . . . , jk′} ⊂ N form the following envy chain at round
r′ ≤ r;
l → j1 → . . .→ jk′.
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Then we connect these two chains
l → i1 → . . .→ ik→
j1 →
. . .→
j
k ′
Note that because the crawler is efficient, there is no cycle of envy. Let K ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let
C = {C1, . . . , CK} be a partition of the agent set N according to the chains. That is, for each
pair k, k′ ∈ {1, . . . , K} such that k 6= k′, each i ∈ Ck is not in the same connected chain with
any j ∈ Ck′ . Let C be the set of subsets of agents that are identified by the partition.
Step 2: Let Ck ∈ C. Let Ck = N
1 ∪ N2 ∪ . . .∪N t be such that, for each q ∈ {1, . . . , t}, the
agents in N t form an envy chain. First,
•
⋃
i∈Ck
gri (ω) =
⋃
i∈Ck
gr−1i (ω).
We derive a generalized chain by combining t connected envy chains. LetC0k = {N
1, . . . , N t}.
Substep s (1 ≤ s ≤ S): Let N ′, N
′′
⊂ Cs−1k .
• For each pair i, j ∈ N ′ such that at substep s− 1, i→ j, set
i→ . . .→ j.
Case 1: Suppose that {i1, . . . , ik, l} ⊆ N
′ and {j1, . . . , jk′, l} ⊆ N
′′
are such that
i1 → . . .→ ik → l
j1
→
. . .
→
jk′
→
We combine the two chains in the following sway.
– jk′ → . . .→ ik if and only if g
r−1
ik
(ω) < gr−1jk′ (ω).
– Suppose that jk′ → . . .→ ik. For each q ∈ {k
′, . . . , 1}, identify p ∈ {k−1, . . . , 1}
such that for each q˜ ∈ {k′, . . . , q}, gr−1jq˜ (ω) < g
r−1
ip
(ω). If there is a unique such
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value, denote it by p∗. If there are multiple such values, take the largest one and
denote it by p∗. Set
ip∗ → . . .→ jq.
If there is no such a value, set
j1 → . . .→ jq → i1.
– Suppose that ik → . . .→ jk′ . For each q ∈ {k, . . . , 1}, identify p ∈ {k
′−1, . . . , 1}
such that for each q˜ ∈ {k, . . . , q}, gr−1iq˜ (ω) < g
r−1
jp
(ω). If there is a unique such
value, denote it by p∗. If there are multiple such values, take the largest one and
denote it by p∗. Set
jp∗ → . . .→ iq.
If there is no such a value, set
i1 → . . .→ iq → j1.
Case 2: Suppose that {l, i1, . . . , ik} ⊆ N
′ and {l, j1, . . . , lk′} ⊆ N
′′
are such that
l → i1 → . . .→ ik→
j1 →
. . .→
j
k ′
We derive combine the two chains in the following sway.
– j1 → . . .→ i1 if and only if g
r−1
i1
(ω) < gr−1j1 (ω).
– Suppose that j1 → . . . → i1. For each q ∈ {2, . . . , k
′}, identify p ∈ {1, . . . , k}
such that for each q˜ ∈ {k′, . . . , q}, gr−1jq˜ (ω) < g
r−1
ip
(ω). If there is a unique such
value, denote it by p∗. If there are multiple such values, take the largest one and
denote it by p∗. Set
ip∗ → . . .→ jq.
If there is no such a value, set
j1 → . . .→ jq → i1.
24
– Suppose that i1 → . . . → j1. For each q ∈ {2, . . . , k
′}, identify p ∈ {1, . . . , k}
such that for each q˜ ∈ {k, . . . , q}, gr−1iq˜ (ω) < g
r−1
jp
(ω). If there is a unique such
value, denote it by p∗. If there are multiple such values, take the largest one and
denote it by p∗. Set
jp∗ → . . .→ iq.
If there is no such a value, set
i1 → . . .→ iq → j1.
• Let Csk be the set of resulting chains formed at substep s.
• When there is only one chain in CSk such that i1 → i2 → . . . → il, let g
r
il
(ω) <
gril−1(ω) < . . . < g
r
i1
(ω).
Step 3: For each Ck ∈ C such that Ck = {i}, let g
s
i (ω) = g
s−1
i (ω).
Step 4: For each i ∈ N , let Osi = O
s−1
i \H
s
i .
The algorithm terminates when for each i ∈ N , we have Osi = ∅.
Example 2. [Illustrating how the procedure above selects the order over the agent set.] Let
N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}. Let ω1 ≺ ω2 ≺ . . . ≺ ω7. Let P ∈ P
N be such that
P1 : ω7, ω6, ω5, ω4, ω3, ω2, ω1
P2 : ω2, . . .
P3 : ω7, ω6, ω5, ω4, ω3, ω2, ω1
P4 : ω6, . . .
P5 : ω7, ω6, ω5, ω4, ω3, ω2, ω1
P6 : ω3, . . .
P7 : ω5, . . . .
Then CRω(P ) = (ω1, ω2, ω4, ω6, ω7, ω3, ω5). First, because ω1 ≺ ω2 ≺ . . . ≺ ω7, we have
g0(ω) = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). For each i ∈ N , O0i = O and H
0
i = ∅.
Round 1: Because for each i ∈ {1, 3}, Xi(O
0
i ) = ω7 = CR
ω
5 (P ), we have i → 5
and H1i = {ω7}. Because, for each j ∈ {2, 4, 5, 6, 7}, Xj(O
0
j ) = CR
ω
j (P ), we have
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H1j = O
0
j . Because g
0
1(ω) < g
0
3(ω), we have g
1(ω) = (5, 2, 1, 4, 3, 6, 7). For each
i ∈ {1, 3}, O1i = {ω1, ω2, . . . , ω6}. For each j ∈ {2, 4, 5, 6, 7},O
1
j = ∅.
Round 2: Because, for each i ∈ {1, 3} Xi(O
1
i ) = ω6 = CR
ω
4 (P ), we have i → 4
and H2i = {ω6}. Because g
1
1(ω) < g
1
3(ω) and g
1
5(ω) < g
1
4(ω), we have g
2(ω) =
(5, 2, 4, 1, 3, 6, 7). For each i ∈ {1, 3}, O2i = {ω1, ω2, . . . , ω5}.
Round 3: Because, for each i ∈ {1, 3} Xi(O
2
i ) = ω5 = CR
ω
7 (P ), we have i → 7
and H3i = {ω5}. Because g
2
1(ω) < g
2
3(ω) and g
2
5(ω) < g
2
4(ω) < g
2
7(ω), we have
g3(ω) = (5, 2, 4, 7, 1, 6, 3). For each i ∈ {1, 3}, O3i = {ω1, ω2, . . . , ω4}.
Round 4: Because X1(O
3
1) = ω4 = CR
ω
3 (P ), we have 1 → 3 and H
4
1 = {ω4}. On
the other hand, because X3(O
3
3) = ω4 = CR
ω
3 (P ), we have H
4
3 = O
3
3. We have
g4(ω) = (5, 2, 4, 7, 3, 6, 1). Also, O41 = {ω1, ω2, ω3} and O
4
3 = ∅.
Round 5: Because X1(O
4
1) = ω3 = CR
ω
6 (P ), we have 1→ 6 andH
5
1 = {ω3}. Because
g43(ω) < g
4
6(ω) we have g
5(ω) = (5, 2, 4, 7, 3, 6, 1). Also, O51 = {ω1, ω2}.
Round 6: Because X1(O
5
1) = ω2 = CR
ω
2 (P ), we have 1→ 2 andH
6
1 = {ω2}. Because
g55(ω) < g
5
2(ω) < g
5
4(ω), we have g
6(ω) = (5, 2, 4, 7, 3, 6, 1). Also, O61 = {ω1}.
Round 7: Because X1(O
6
1) = ω1 = CR
ω
1 (P ), we have H
7
1 = O
6
1. Because there is no
envy chain, g7(ω) = g6(ω) = (5, 2, 4, 7, 3, 6, 1). We have O71 = ∅. Hence, no agent
remains. So the algorithm terminates at this step.
Therefore, g(ω) = (5, 2, 4, 7, 3, 6, 1).
We show that the crawler induced by an endowment profile and the sequential priority rule
induced by the order on the agent set given by the mapping select the same allocation,
Claim 4. CRω(P ) = SP g(ω)(P ).
Proof of Claim 4. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there is a sequence of agents {i1, · · · , ik} ⊆ N
such that for each k′ ∈ {1, · · · , k− 1}, SP
g(ω)
ik′
(P ) = CRωik′+1(P ) Pik′ CR
ω
ik′
(P ). Because the
crawler is efficient, SP
g(ω)
ik
(P ) 6= CRωik(P ) and CR
ω
ik
(P ) Pik SP
g(ω)
ik
(P ). This implies that
gik−1(ω) < gik(ω). However, because CR
ω
ik
(P ) Pk CR
ω
ik−1
(P ), there is s ∈ {1, · · · , S} such
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that agent ik−1 envies agent ik at round s. This implies that gik(ω) < gik−1(ω), a contradic-
tion.
Let ω ∈ X . Consider round s of the procedure. Take an envy chain formed at round s and
label the agents in the chain in such a way that each agent, except for the last agent, envies an
agent on his right at round s. Consider two endowment profiles in which each agent who is not
in the chain has the same endowment. We show that if the allocations selected by the crawler
at each of these endowment profiles are the same, each agent in the sequence is also endowed
with the same object in the two profiles.
Claim 5. Let ω ∈ X . Let s ∈ {1, . . . , S}. Let N ′ = {i1, · · · , ik} ⊆ N be such that for
each k′ ∈ {1, · · · , k − 1}, agent ik′ envies agent ik′+1 at round s. Let ω˜ ∈ X be such that
ω˜−N ′ = ω−N ′ . If CR
ω˜(P ) = CRω(P ), then ω˜ = ω.
Proof of Claim 5. Without loss of generality, suppose that s = 1. First, note that
(∗) for each k′ ∈ {1, . . . , k − 2}, either p(Pik′ ) ≺ p(Pik′+1) or p(Pik′+1) ≺ p(Pik′ ),
and there is no o ∈ O\
{
p(Pik′ ), p(Pik′+1)
}
such that p(Pik′ ) ≺ o ≺ p(Pik′+1) or p(Pik′+1) ≺ o ≺ p(Pik′ ).
The proof is by induction on k.
Base step: Suppose that k = 2. Let p(Pi1) = p(Pi2) ≡ o. There are four possible configura-
tions of the endowments of agents 1 and 2 relative to object o.
Case 1: ωi1 ≺ ωi2 - o. Suppose that ω˜i1 = ωi2 and ω˜i2 = ωi1 . Because ω˜i2 ≺ ω˜i1 - o,
at ω˜, the ownership of agent i1 is shifted to object o. This implies that CR
ω
i2
(P ) 6= o, a
contradiction.
Case 2: o - ωi2 ≺ ωi1 . Suppose that ω˜i1 = ωi2 and ω˜i2 = ωi1 . Because o - ω˜i1 ≺ ω˜i2 ,
at ω˜, agent i1 is visited earlier than i2 is. This implies that CR
ω˜
i2
(P ) 6= o, a contradiction.
Case 3: ωi2 - o ≺ ωi1 . Let
S = {i ∈ N : ωi2 ≺ ωi ≺ ωi1 and CR
ω
i (P ) ≺ ωi2} .
Because CRωi2(P ) = o, we have |S| ≥ |o − ωi2 | − 1. Suppose that ω˜i1 = ωi2 and
ω˜i2 = ωi1 . Hence, ω˜i1 - o ≺ ω˜i2 . Let
S˜ =
{
i ∈ N : ω˜i1 ≺ ω˜i ≺ ω˜i2 and CR
ω˜
i (P ) ≺ ω˜i1
}
.
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Because CRω˜(P ) = CRω(P ), we have S˜ = S. This implies that |S˜| ≥ |o − ω˜i1 | − 1.
Hence, at ω˜, the ownership of agent i1 is shifted to object o earlier than agent i2 is visited.
This implies that CRω˜i2(P ) 6= o, a contradiction.
Case 4: ωi1 ≺ o - ωi2 . Let
T = {i ∈ N : ωi1 ≺ ωi ≺ ωi2 and CR
ω
i (P ) ≺ ωi1} .
Because CRωi2(P ) = o, we have |T | < |o − ωi1| − 1. Suppose that ω˜i1 = ωi2 and
ω˜i2 = ωi1 . Hence, ω˜i2 ≺ o - ω˜i1 . Let
T˜ =
{
i ∈ N : ω˜i2 ≺ ω˜i ≺ ω˜i1 and CR
ω˜
i (P ) ≺ ω˜i2
}
.
Because CRω˜(P ) = CRω(P ), we have T˜ = T . This implies that |T˜ | < |o − ω˜i2 | − 1.
Hence, at ω˜, agent i1 is visited earlier than the ownership of agent i2 is shifted to object o.
This implies that CRω˜i2(P ) 6= o, a contradiction.
Induction hypothesis: LetK ∈ {2, · · · , n}. For each k ≤ K − 1, we have ω˜ik = ωik .
Induction step: Suppose that k = K. We show that ω˜ik = ωik . Then by the induction hypoth-
esis, we have ω˜N ′ = ωN ′ . Let p(Pik−1) = p(Pik) ≡ o. There are four possible configurations
of the endowment profile relative to object o.
Case 1: For each i ∈ N ′, ωi - o. The envy chain formed by N
′ exists only if
for each k′ ∈ {1, · · · , k − 1}, ωk′ ≺ p(Rk′) and ωik′ ≺ ωk′+1. This implies that
CRω˜(P ) = CRω(P ) holds only if ω˜ik = ωik .
Case 2: For each i ∈ N ′, o - ωi. The envy chain formed by N
′ exists only if
for each k′ ∈ {1, · · · , k − 1}, p(Rik) ≺ ωik and ωik+1 ≺ ωik . This implies that
CRω˜(P ) = CRω(P ) holds only if ω˜ik = ωik .
Otherwise, there is a pair i, j ∈ N ′ such that ωi - o - ωj , and there is no k ∈ N
′ such
that either ωi ≺ ωk - o or o - ωk ≺ ωj . Note that the envy chain formed by N
′ exists
only if either i = ik or j = ik holds.
Case 3: ωik - o ≺ ωj. Suppose that ω˜ik = ωj and ω˜il = ωik , where l ∈ {k−1, . . . , 1}.
Suppose that l = k − 1. At ω˜, the ownership of agent ik−1 is shifted to object o earlier
28
than agent ik is visited. This implies that CR
ω
ik
(P ) 6= o, a contradiction. Suppose that
l ∈ {k − 2, . . . , 1}. Let
U = {i ∈ N : ωik ≺ ωi ≺ ωj and CR
ω
i (P ) ≺ ωik} and
U˜ =
{
i ∈ N : ω˜il ≺ ω˜i ≺ ω˜ik and CR
ω˜
i (P ) ≺ ω˜il
}
.
Because CRω(P ) = CRω˜(P ), we have U = U˜ . This implies that at ω˜, the ownership
of agent il is shifted to object o earlier than agent ik is visited. Hence, if p(Pil) ≺ o,
we have CRω˜il(P ) = p(Pil), a contradiction. Suppose that o ≺ p(Pil). The ownership
of agent il is shifted to at least object o. Note that for each t ∈ {k − 1, . . . , l + 1},
object p(Pit+1) is assigned to some agent before object p(Pit) is assigned to some agent.
Moreover, for each t ∈ {k − 1, . . . , l + 1 }, p(Pit) ≺ p(Pil). Then by (∗), the
ownership of agent il is shifted to object p(Pil) earlier than agent il+1 is either visited or
his ownership is shifted to object p(Pil). Hence, CR
ω˜
il
(P ) = p(Pil), a contradiction.
Consequently, ω˜ik = ωik .
Case 4: ωi ≺ o - ωik . Suppose that ω˜ik = ωi and ω˜il = ωik , where l ∈ {k−1, . . . , 1}.
Suppose that l = k− 1. At ω˜, agent ik−1 is visited earlier than the ownership of agent ik
is shifted to object o. This implies that CRω˜ik(P ) 6= o, a contradiction. Suppose that
l ∈ {k − 2, . . . , 1}. Let
V = {j ∈ N : ωi ≺ ωj ≺ ωik and ωik ≺ CR
ω
i (P )} and
V˜ =
{
j ∈ N : ω˜ik ≺ ω˜j ≺ ω˜il and ω˜il ≺ CR
ω˜
i (P )
}
.
Because CRω(P ) = CRω˜(P ), we have V = V˜ . Suppose that p(Pil) - ωik . Because
at ω˜, agent il is visited and receives his assignment first among the agents in N
′, we
have CRω˜il(P ) = p(Pil), a contradiction. Suppose that ωik ≺ p(Pil). Note for each
t ∈ {k − 1, . . . , l + 1}, object p(Pit+1) is assigned to some agent before object p(Pit)
is assigned to some agent. Moreover, for each t ∈ {k − 1, . . . , l + 1}, p(Pit) ≺ p(Pil).
Then by (∗), the ownership of agent il is shifted to object p(Pil) earlier than agent il+1
is either visited or his ownership is shifted to object p(Pil). Hence, CR
ω˜
il
(P ) = p(Pil), a
contradiction. Consequently, ω˜ik = ωik .
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Given ω ∈ X , for each s ∈ {1, . . . , S}, let ωs ∈ X be defined by setting for each i ∈ N ,
ωsi ≺ ω
s
i+1 if and only if g
s−1
i (ω) < g
s−1
i+1 (ω). We call ω
s the endowment profile at step s.
Claim 6. g is a one-to-one mapping. That is, for each pair ω, ω˜ ∈ X , if g(ω) = g(ω˜), then
ω = ω˜.
Proof of Claim 6. Let ω, ω˜ ∈ X be such that g(ω) = g(ω˜). Hence, CRω(P ) = CRω˜(P ). Let
s ∈ {0, . . . , S}, and suppose that gS(ω) = g(ω). We show that ω = ω˜ by induction on s.
Base step: Suppose that s = S − 1. Note that round S is the last round of the procedure
when the endowment profile is ω. Because CRω(P ) = CRω˜(P ), when the endowment profile
is ω˜, round S is also the last round of the procedure. Let CSk ⊆ N form a connected chain
at endowment profile ω. Because CRω(P ) = CRω˜(P ), CSk also form the same connected
chain at round S when the endowment profile is ω˜. Let i ∈ CSk . Let j /∈ C
S
k . Suppose that
ω˜Si = ω
S
j . Because C
S
k form a connected chain at round S when the endowment profile is ω˜,
there is k ∈ CSk such that g
S
k (ω˜) 6= g
S
k (ω). Moreover, because round S is the last round of the
procedure for both ω and ω˜, we have gk(ω˜) 6= gk(ω), a contradiction. Let j ∈ C
S
k be such that
agents i and j do not belong to the same chain. Suppose that ω˜i = ωj . Then by construction
of g, there is k ∈ CSk such that g
S
i (ω) < g
S
k (ω) and g
S
k (ω˜) > g
S
i (ω˜), or g
S
i (ω) > g
S
k (ω) and
gSk (ω˜) < g
S
i (ω˜). Because round S is the last round of the procedure for both ω and ω˜, we have
gk(ω˜) 6= gk(ω), a contradiction. Finally, by Claim 5, we have g
S−1
i (ω˜) = g
S−1
i (ω). Therefore,
gS−1(ω˜) = gS−1(ω).
Induction hypothesis: Let s′ ∈ {0, . . . , S − 1}. For each s ≥ s′ + 1, we have gs(ω˜) = gs(ω).
Induction step: Suppose that s = s′. Suppose that gs(ω˜) 6= gs(ω). This implies that
ω˜s+1 6= ωs+1. By the induction hypothesis, for each t ≥ s + 1, we have gt(ω˜) = gt(ω). Let
Cs+1k ⊆ N form a connected chain at endowment profile is ω. Because CR
ω˜(P ) = CRω(P ),
Cs+1k form the same relation at round s + 1 when the endowment profile is ω˜. Let i ∈ C
s+1
k .
Let j /∈ Cs+1k . Suppose that ω˜
s+1
i = ω
s+1
j . Because C
s+1
k form a connected chain at round
s + 1 when the endowment profile is ω˜, there is k ∈ Cs+1k such that g
s+1
k (ω˜) 6= g
s+1
k (ω), a
contradiction. Let j ∈ Cs+1k be such that agents i and j do not belong to the same chain. Sup-
pose that ω˜i = ωj . Then by construction of g, there is k ∈ C
s+1
k such that g
s+1
i (ω) < g
s+1
k (ω)
and gs+1k (ω˜) > g
s+1
i (ω˜), or g
s+1
i (ω) > g
s+1
k (ω) and g
s+1
k (ω˜) < g
s+1
i (ω˜). This contradicts
the fact that gs+1(ω˜) = gs+1(ω). Finally, by Claim 5, we have gsi (ω˜) = g
s
i (ω). Therefore,
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gs(ω˜) = gs(ω).
Consequently, ω = ω˜.
Claim 7. g is an onto mapping. That is, for each f ∈ F , there is ω ∈ X such that g(ω) = f .
Proof of Claim 7. By Claims 4 and 6, for each x ∈ X ,
|{ω ∈ X : CRω(P ) = x}| ≤
∣∣{f ∈ F : SP f(P ) = x}∣∣ .
Hence, ∑
x∈X
|{ω ∈ X : CRω(P ) = x}| ≤
∑
x∈X
∣∣{f ∈ F : SP f(P ) = x}∣∣ .
However, the left-hand side of the inequality is equal to the number of possible endowment
profiles and its right-hand side is equal to the number of orderings over the agents. Both of
these numbers equal to n!. Therefore, for each x ∈ X ,
|{ω ∈ X : CRω(P ) = x}| =
∣∣{f ∈ F : SP f(P ) = x}∣∣ .
This implies that for each f ∈ F , there is ω ∈ X such that g(ω) = f .
C An example showing that the crawler is not a member of
the trading cycles family
For our purpose, it will suffice to formally define the trading cycles family for problems with
three agents and three objects.16 For each N ′ = {i1, . . . , in′} ⊆ N and each O
′ ⊆ O such
that |N ′| = |O′|, a “partial allocation for N ′” is a list xN ′ = (xi1 , . . . , xin′ ) such that for each
i ∈ N ′, xi ∈ O
′, and for each pair i, j ∈ N ′ such that i 6= j, xi 6= xj . We call each i ∈ N\N
′
an “unassigned agent”, and each o ∈ O\O′ an “unassigned object”. Let XN ′ be the set of
partial allocations forN ′. Let Y =
⋃
N ′⊆N XN ′ . Obviously,X ⊂ Y . Let Y = Y \ X . For each
y ∈ Y , letN y be the set of unassigned agents at y andOy be the set of unassigned objects at y.
A “control-rights structure” is a collection of mappings{
(cy, by) : Oy → Ny × {ownership, brokerage}
}
y∈Y
such that
16Refer to Pycia and U¨nver (2017) for general problems.
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(R1) At the empty allocation, i.e., when the set of unassigned objects is the entire set of
objects, each object is brokered.17
(R2) If agent i is the only unassigned agent at y, he owns all of the unassigned objects at y.
(R3) If agent i brokers an object at y, he does not control any other objects at y.
Moreover, for each pair y, y′ ∈ Y such that y ⊂ y′ and each i ∈ Ny′ such that there is o ∈ Oy′
that agent i owns at y,18
(R4) Agent i owns object o at y′.
(R5) If agent j ∈ Ny′ brokers object o
′ ∈ Oy′ at y, then either agent j brokers object o
′ at y′
or agent i owns object o′ at y′.
(R6) If agent j ∈ Ny′ controls object o
′ ∈ Oy′ at y, then agent j owns object o at y ∪ {(i, o
′)}.19
Trading Cycles: (For problems with three agents and three objects.) Let (c, b) be a control-
rights structure. Let P ∈ PN .
Let x0 be the empty allocation. In each round r = 1, 2, . . . , some agents are assigned
objects. We denote by xr−1 the partial allocation at round r − 1. Note that xr−1 ⊂ xr. If
xr−1 ∈ Y , the algorithm proceeds with the following steps of round r.
Step 1: Pointing. Each o ∈ Oxr−1 points to the agent who controls it at x
r−1. Each i ∈ Nxr−1
points to his most preferred object in Oxr−1 .
A cycle
o1 → i1 → . . . ok → ik → o1
is simple if there is an agent in the cycle who owns an object.
Step 2a: Executing “simple” cycles. Each agent in each simple cycle is assigned the object
he is pointing to.
Step 2b: Forcing brokers to downgrade their pointing. If there are non-simple cycles, we
proceed as follows:
• If there is a cycle in which there is a broker i who points to a brokered object, and there
is another broker or owner who points to the same object, we force broker i to point to
his next most preferred object in Oxr−1 and we return to step 2(a).
17This assumption is only for problems with three agents and three objects. It differs for general problems.
18y ⊂ y′ means that if an agent is assigned an object at y, then he is assigned the same object at y′.
19(i, o′) means that agent i is assigned object o′.
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• Otherwise, we clear all cycles by assigning each agent in each cycle the object he is
pointing to.
Step 3: Each agent who has been assigned an object leaves with his assignment. If each agent
is assigned an object, the algorithm terminates.
The following example shows that there is a problem such that there is no control-rights
structure such that the associated rule always select the same allocation as the crawler.
Example 3. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and O = {o1, o2, o3}. Let ω = (o1, o2, o3). Let P ∈ P
N be
such that
P1 : o2, . . .
P2 : o1, o2, o3
P3 : o1, o2, o3.
Then
CRω(P ) = (o2, o1, o3).
There are two control-rights structure such that TC(c,b)(P ) = CRω(P );
Case 1 : At the empty allocation, agents 1, 2, and 3 broker objects o1, o3, and o2, respectively.
Case 2 : At the empty allocation, agents 1, 2, and 3 broker objects o3, o2, and o1, respectively.
Consider Case 1. For each i ∈ N , let P ′i ∈ P
N be defined by
P ′i : o1, o2, o3.
Then
CRω(P ′) = (o1, o2, o3) 6= (o2, o1, o3) = TC
(c,b)(P ′).
Consider Case 2. For each i ∈ N , let P˜ ∈ PN be defined by
P˜i : o3, o2, o1.
Then
CRω(P˜ ) = (o1, o2, o3) 6= (o2, o1, o3) = TC
(c,b)(P˜ ).
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